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This sure does seem odd. I've advised my team to stick with their existing versions and to wait until the dust settles. |
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It's not unique to security software like TrueCrypt. MD5 hashing offers integrity "peace of mind" just beyond the security implication, for example downloading router firmware. A corrupted firmware image = a bricked router. If you're not verifying the checksum, you're just asking for trouble. |
I'm not always on Windows, but when I am I really like the <a href="http://code.kliu.org/hashcheck/">HashCheck Shell Extension</a>.
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I don't ever use Windows anymore but when I did I used winMd5Sum Portable.
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MD5 checksum is great to verify an already compiled executable. Its not as great for verifying code that you compile yourself, since that will vary depending on the hardware and software used to compile. That has been a longstanding problem with Truecrypt until recently (source doesnt perfectly match pre-compiled executable).
Those who argue that people should simply audit the source themselves to verify authenticity are either ignorant or being obtuse. Auditing Cryptographic software (and its implementation) is just too complex for a single user. An example of this is the underhanded C contest whose point is to get malicous code past a rigorous inspection. |
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Some of the the armchair bullshit in this thread is hilarious.
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You're stance on this, and multiple threads, seems to border on total paranoia rather than anything even remotely practical. What would your proposed solution be? |
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My stance on Truecrypt is that it may be compromised. That is not paranoia. What you suggest (that people should independantly audit code for each version) is not practical. Quote:
The Audit of truecrypt has already been paid for, and stage 1 has been completed. Its worthwhile to see what vulnerabilities are found after a complete audit of version 7.1a. Auditers need to implement a warrant canary in case they receive a NSL to prevent them from disclosing vulnerabilities in 7.1a. If Truecrypt is found to be vulnerable, than the project should be forked and patched. Till more information is known, users should investigate alternatives. |
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My counter to that was that it's inherently better than closed-source software because it's open to peer review. Now you're parroting precisely what I said previously. Quote:
Other than "stop using TrueCrypt" what would be your suggestion for people that need that functionality? Quote:
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Truecrypt is such a good standard that shifting will be very painful.
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It's also rolled into some of the tactical collection drives that I use.
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2. understand your threat level. truecrypt is likely still secure enough for those who are not being pursued by a nation state. Those using truecrypt should always fully shutdown their computer and not use suspended animation such as hibernate. Use best security practices. 3. Consider migrating to a Linux variant OS if one has not already done so. 4. Any highly sensitive data should be air-gapped, and likely on read only media (run from a live cd). |
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